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Abstract
This paper is devoted to the analysis of all constitutions equipped with elec-
toral systems involving two step procedures. First, one candidate is elected in
every jurisdiction by the electors in that jurisdiction, according to some aggre-
gation procedure. Second, another aggregation procedure collects the names of
the jurisdictional winners in order to designate the final winner. It appears that
whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot,
they are able to manipulate the result of the election except in very few cases.
When imposing a paretian condition on every jurisdiction’s voting rule, it is shown
that, in the case of any finite number of candidates, any two steps voting rule
that is not manipulable by movement of the electors necessarily gives to every
voter the power of overruling the unanimity on its own. A characterization of the
set of these rules is next provided in the case of two candidates.
JEL classification number: D71, D72
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1 Introduction
In this paper we are interested in all constitutions with electoral systems such that the
winner of the election is designated in a two step procedure, like for instance Great-
Britain, Canada or the US electoral systems. In these constitutions, the country is
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divided into jurisdictions in which elections are held at the first step as to choose
the jurisdictional winners. In the second step, the government is appointed by an
aggregation procedure over all the jurisdictional winners. The question that is under
scrutiny is that of the stability and the manipulability by movement of the voters of
constitutions with such two step electoral procedures.
The issue of manipulability by movement of such systems has currently been at stake,
as suggest the following recent examples. During the 2005 campaign in Great-Britain for
the election of the Members of Parliament (MPs), various websites and forums have been
created invoking tactical vote (votedorset.net, helpbeathoward.org.uk, tacticalvoter.net,
ditchdavis.com...). On votedorset.net, we could find the following advertisement before
the election
“Four Lib Dems are seeking suitable Labour pairs, and our target is Oliver
Letwin’s seat (a Conservative MP). We would like to swap all four of our
tactical votes for Labour in Burton (East Staffordshire) with four equivalent
tactical votes for the Lib Dems in Dorset West.”
For electoral purposes Britain is divided into constituencies, each of which returns one
MP to the House of Commons. The British electoral system is based on the relative
majority method - usually referred to as the plurality rule, sometimes also called the
“first past the post” principle - which means the candidate with more votes than any
other is elected. The leader of the political party which wins most seats (although not
necessarily most votes) at a general election, or who has the support of a majority of
members in the House of Commons, is by convention invited by the Sovereign to form
the new government. The purpose of the websites about tactical vote is to change what
would be the result of the election if everyone voted in his constituency. They thus
offer to match people located in different constituencies and willing to exchange their
votes in order to beat their commonly less desired candidate, the Conservative in this
case. However, these voters give up their first choice, hoping that their pair will do the
same in their constituency. Consequently, although the overall number of votes granted
to every party is the same, the result of the final election might be reversed by such a
manipulation.
Such an idea was earlier implemented by the ecologist party’s supporters backing
Ralph Nader, a candidate running in the 2000 election in the US. There again, voters
connected to the net (see, among others, www.voteswap.com) could decide to vote for
Gore instead of Nader in states where the election was tight between Gore and Bush,
while all paired voters would vote for Nader in states where Gore had a large victory
planned. Although Gore won the popular vote by more than 540.000 votes, Bush was
elected after his victory in Florida, which happened to be the swing state, by 537 votes
only. There is no doubt that such a manipulation could have been very efficiently
implemented, in order to reverse the result of that presidential election. For more on
vote trading implementing through internet sites, see the recent paper by Hartvigsen
(2006).
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From a logical standpoint, such a manipulation is in fact logically equivalent to al-
lowing voters to change the constituency they are voting in. Indeed, two voters swapping
votes amounts to voters swapping residency. We thus suggest that electoral procedures
involving two steps are in general subject to such manipulability by movement of the
electors.
In what follows, stability refers to the fact that, in such constitutions, the result of
the two step election should be the same, whatever the location of the individuals when
they cast their ballot. Conversely, an unstable constitution would be such that for two
different partitions of the set of individuals into jurisdictions, the election could yield
two different outcomes. Stability, such as defined here, does not refer to any change
in the electors’ vote profile, rather it is only concerned with their location. In turn, a
constitution such that some electors can not only change the result of the election by
changing jurisdiction but can change it in their favour, will be said to be manipulable.
Manipulability by movement, such as considered in this paper, is different from the
standard notion of manipulation a` la Gibbard-Satterthwaite (1973, 1975). Indeed, in
our analysis we assume that individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction, but when
doing so, they do not change their vote. Contrary to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite re-
sult, we are not concerned by the fact electors vote for their best alternative or not,
nevertheless we assume they behave identically, whatever the jurisdiction they vote in.
Issues about such manipulations, that do not involve vote swapping, are raised
within the European community. Considering the lot of nomadic populations, whose
civic rights are rarely guaranteed, two European deputies, Alima Boumedienne-Thiery
and Olivier Duhamel advocate the creation of a “European right to vote” for nomadic
people, allowing them to vote in whichever country they are in at the moment of the
European elections. Actually, this idea of an European right to vote is to be extended
to all European citizens, as Alima Boumedienne-Thiery and Olivier Duhamel (2000)
recommend :
“in a context of extreme mobility, it is fundamental that the individual be a
citizen wherever he is, as more and more persons will spend a considerable
amount of their time abroad”
If any voter has the right to vote in any country for European elections, it seems im-
portant to be equipped with electoral rules that are non manipulable by the movement
of the voters. As a last illustrating example, let us recall that French citizens living
abroad are allowed, when voting, to choose the constituency in which they cast their
ballot for some of the French elections.
One solution to this problem of could be simply resolved by prohibiting electors
from changing jurisdiction to cast their ballot. However, eventhough electors are not
allowed to change jurisdiction, the designers of the election may try to artificialy make
them move. This is known under the name of gerrymandering. Indeed, the design of
boundaries is sometimes subject to serious contentious in the United States, suggesting
that politicians aim at altering the results of the election by doing so. Gerrymandering
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is, from a logical point of view, equivalent to manipulation by movements of the electors.
Instead of the voters themselves, the designers of the jurisdictions’ boundaries are the
manipulators.
Since Arrow’s impossibility theorem (see Arrow (1963)), the axiomatic approach
of social choice theory has provided a floodgate of negative or positive results for the
analysis of voting rules. Surprisingly enough, little attention has been devoted to the
study of two step procedures, though a few contributions have already proposed nor-
mative conditions to judge the quality of a federal system (as two step procedures), the
oldest being due to Penrose (1946) and Banzhaf (1968): both suggested that in federal
unions, every voter should be given the same power, that is the same probability to in-
fluence the outcome. More recently, Felsenthal and Machover (1999) as well as Barbera`
and Jackson (2004) have come with the following suggestion: a federal state should
maximize on average the total utility of the citizens. Feix, Lepelley, Merlin and Rouet
(2004) have suggested that the way to attribute mandates to a state should minimize
the probability of electing a candidate who does not obtain the majority of the popular
vote over the whole union. However, all these papers assume the same structure: there
is a two party competition in every state and the party which obtains the majority of
the votes gets all the mandates for this state. Then some kind of quota rule is used at
the federal level1. Furthermore, there is a long tradition of contributions on the round-
ing off problem, that is, the search of rules to allocate the mandates proportionally to
the populations of the different members (see the classical book of Balinski and Young
(1982)). This tradition assumes from the start that the voting rule is the proportional
rule.
It is important to notice that from a conceptual point of view, the framework consid-
ered here is different from that of Arrow’s theorem. First, given the two step procedure
and allowing for voters to change jurisdiction, it appears that the global electoral rule
must be defined by the specific partition of the electors in addition to the vote profile.
Contrary to the traditional arrovian framework, more than just the preferences are re-
quired here in order to define the federal constitution voting procedure. Hence, the fact
that the rule depends on the partition of the electors makes it possible for one given
vote profile to yield to different winners, according to the partition. For that reason,
the combination of jurisdictional rules that are social choice functions, with a federal
rule that is also a social choice function, cannot be summarized into one unique social
choice function, hence departing from the arrovian framework2. Next, the imposition
of a sovereignty condition, as will be done throughout, makes it impossible to define
1The second level of aggregation will be called throughout the federal level, for convenience only.
It is in fact an abuse of language as there are federal systems in which elections are direct (Brasil for
instance) and systems that are not federal but in which elections are indirect (United Kingdom for
instance).
2In its original form, the Arrow theorem considers social welfare functions. The remark just made,
pointing out the difference with our framework lies elsewhere than in this distinction between social
welfare functions and social choice functions. It relies on the fact that we take into account more
information than the preferences.
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a dictatorship in this framework, as will be shown further. This also implies that the
framework considered differs from that of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem about
manipulation.
In this paper, we study two step voting procedures in a general framework that does
not restrict the particular voting method used at every step of the procedure. So far,
the only requirement made on these jurisdictional voting rules is that of Jurisdiction
Sovereignty, stating that the result of the election in every jurisdiction should only
depend on the votes casted by the individuals within that jurisdiction. Thus the result
should be independent of what happens in the neighbor jurisdictions. We then assume
that individuals submit one vote for one candidate in their jurisdiction, the votes being
aggregated by the jurisdictional voting rules. Next, the candidates winning at first step
are collected and aggregated at the second step, with a federal voting rule.
The question examined in this paper is that of the existence of constitutions involv-
ing two step procedures whose results are independent from the location of voters and
are, therefore, stable and non manipulable in the sense given to these words above. In
the case of an arbitrary finite number of candidates, the answer to that question is pos-
itive, although the set of rules allowing for “movement-proofness” is very small. When
imposing a jurisdictional paretian condition, according to which a jurisdiction should
elect a given candidate when he receives the unanimity of votes in that jurisdiction, the
rules we are left with are rather undemocratic3. The first set of rules satisfying stability
is the Constant Constitution, stating that whoever the winners are at the first step (the
jurisdiction level), the winner at the second step is always the same. The federal voting
rule is thus constant with respect to the vote profile. The second set of rules satisfying
stability all share an undesirable feature. Hence, as to satisfy stability, if the rule is not
the Constant Constitution, it is necessary that every individual in the society is given
the power of overruling the unanimity. Individuals are then said to be pivotal.
In the more specific case of two candidates, the same analysis leads to a complete
characterization result, for which the set of rules satisfying stability as well as the juris-
dictional paretian condition is defined. This set consists of the Constant Constitution
and the so called Unanimity Rules, that requires unanimity for one candidate for him
to be elected, while any other situation elects his rival. Next, the paretian condition
is relaxed into a condition called Local Faithfulness, following Young (1974)’s termi-
nology, stating that when a jurisdiction is formed by a single individual, the winner in
that jurisdiction should be the one chosen by that individual. We then observe that
the set of rules satisfying stability is still formed of the Constant Constitution and the
Unanimity Rules, but a third class of rules appear. It is the rather strange class of
Parity Rules, that has not yet, at the best of our knowledge, been studied. A Parity
Rule designates in every jurisdiction as well as at the aggregate level, a candidate ac-
3The term “democratic” does not refer to any precise definition, rather it is the general feeling
individuals share about what is democratic or not. As a more rigorous statement, the set of rules
satisfying stability do not treat the alternatives equally (May’s neutrality condition is violated), which
seems to be an consensual feature of democracy.
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cording to the parity of the votes the candidate receives. Thus, it appears thus that no
constitution involving a two step electoral procedure can be democratic and stable at
the same time. The positive answer that is provided to the question examined herein
is thus to be taken as an impossibility result.
At this stage, it is useful to mention some previous works on representative democ-
racies, due to Murakami (1966), Fishburn (1971) and Fine (1972) concentrating on
the specific case where the collective decisions rest on the majority rule between two
alternatives. These studies completed May (1952)’s characterization of the majority
rule by relaxing the anonymity assumption. Murakami’s main result states that a rep-
resentative system using the majority rule at each stage is characterized by neutrality,
monotonicity, and non-dictatorship. The analysis presented herein departs from these
works as it considers any finite number of candidates and it does not assume majority
rule from the start. It also is restrained to the case of two steps procedures. In this
regard, this contribution is closer to the recent ones of Laffond and Laine´ (1999, 2000),
Chambers (2006) and Perote-Pen˜a (2005), which also consider more than two alter-
natives and two steps procedures. Differences and similarities between these various
contributions will be discussed at the end of section 5.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the
formal framework used for modelling two step voting procedures and we present several
normative properties that may be imposed on them. In particular, we discuss the
different stability properties that prevent the outcome of these voting procedures from
being manipulable by a move of the electors. Section 3 provides the main theorem of
the paper for the general case of any finite number of candidates. Section 4 provides
a more complete characterization result in the case of two candidates and explores
the consequences of relaxing the paretian condition into the milder Local Faithfulness
condition. Section 5 gives some additional comments and concludes.
2 The general framework
2.1 Notations and Definitions
Let the finite and fixed set of candidates be defined as A = {a1, a2, . . . , ap}, the fixed
set of voters is N = {1, . . . , i, . . . , n}, with n ≥ 3, and J = {J1, . . . , Jj, . . . , Jm} is the
set of jurisdictions, with m ≥ 2. We also assume that n > m.
Let σ be a partition function from N to {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Formally, ∀i ∈ N , σ(i) = j ⇔
i ∈ Jj, with J1 ∪ J2 ∪ . . . ∪ Jm = N and Jj ∩ Jk = ∅. In what follows, we will consider
partition functions in Σ, defined as the set of all partitions such that ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
σ−1(j) 6= ∅. Hence for any partition σ in Σ, there is no empty jurisdiction and as
n > m, there is at least one jurisdiction with at least two individuals.
Individuals are equipped with a linear ordering Âi on A, a linear ordering being a
binary relation that is reflexive, transitive, complete and antisymmetric. Individuals
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vote for one unique candidate in A in the jurisdiction they reside in. It is important at
this stage to note that individuals can vote according to their linear ordering, i.e. for
their favorite candidate4, but they might vote for any other candidate in A. Indeed, in
what follows, we analyse what happens when electors change the jurisdiction they vote
in. However we always assume that when they move, the electors do not change the
candidate they vote for. Thus what we are looking at is manipulation by movement of
voters, it is not manipulation a` la Gibbard-Satterthwaite.
pi ∈ An denotes a vote profile. Typically, a vote profile is identified with a vectors of
a’s, b’s, . . . where the ith coordinate indicates individual i’s vote. pi|i denotes individual
i’s vote and for any subset S of N , we denote by pi|S the restriction of pi to S.
For an election, the j-th jurisdiction Jj will provide a jurisdictional winner desig-
nated by the social choice function fj:
fj : Σ× An → A
(σ, pi) → z ∈ A
We impose the following very mild condition on the functions {fj}j=1,m :
Definition 1 Jurisdiction Sovereignty
If [pi|Jj = pi′|Jj ] and [σ(i) = j ⇔ σ′(i) = j] then fj(σ, pi) = fj(σ′, pi′)∀j
In words, the result of an election in jurisdiction Jj is independent from what hap-
pens in any other jurisdiction Jj′ . This property is an independence condition that
makes a federation consistent. Indeed, the indirect characteristic of the electoral sys-
tem would vanish without it. The set of all social choice functions satisfying Jurisdiction
Sovereignty is denoted by F .
The m jurisdictional winners yield a jurisdictional vote profile Π ∈ Am, called a
federal profile. The federation then appoints a federal winner using the federal social
choice function g defined as follows:
g : Am → A
Π = (z1, . . . , zm) → z ∈ A
A federal constitution is given by a (m+1)-tuplet C = (g, f1, . . . , fm), with fj ∈ F ,∀j.
For a given constitution, the federal winner of the election will be denoted by:
g(f1(σ, pi), . . . , fm(σ, pi)) = g(f(σ, pi))
Remark 1 Although functions fj and g are social choice functions, the combination
of these in a two steps procedure does not generate a social choice function. Strictly
speaking, a social choice function has for only argument the preferences of the voters,
whereas, in order to define the voting procedure of the federal constitution, it is necessary
to take as an argument the partition of the individuals in addition to the vote profile.
4Since A is finite and Âi is antisymmetric, there is a unique best element in A for every individual.
7
The following example illustrates the previous remark, by showing that it is possible
for one vote profile pi to yield different results.
Assume there are 2 candidates, A = {a, b}, and there are 5 electors in the society,
partitioned into 3 jurisdictions J1, J2, J3. Assume furthermore that the jurisdictional
rules as well as the federal voting rule are all given by the majority rule. In case of a
tie in a jurisdiction (resp. at the federal level), a will arbitrarily be designated as the
winner in that jurisdiction (resp. in the federation). Consider now the voting profile
pi = (a, a, a, b, b) where individuals 1 to 3 vote for a while individuals 4 and 5 vote for
b. Partition σ is such that σ(1) = σ(2) = σ(3) = 1, σ(4) = 2 and σ(5) = 3. Thus the
winner in J1 is a, while the winner in J2 and J3 is b, so that Π = (a, b, b). Therefore,
g(f(σ, pi)) = g(Π) = b. Consider now another partition σ′ such that σ′(1) = 1, σ′(2) =
σ′(3) = σ′(4) = 2 and σ′(5) = 3. In that case, the winner in J1 and in J2 is a, while the
winner in J3 is b. Therefore, Π
′ = (a, a, b), so that g(f(σ′, pi)) = a.
2.2 Properties
We define some properties we might impose on the different social choice functions.
The first two axioms are imposed on the jurisdiction functions fj:
Axiom 1 Local Faithfulness
If Jj = {i} then fj(σ, pi) = pi|i
Faithfulness was first introduced by Young (1974) for his characterization of the Borda
Choice Correspondence. It requires that when society consists of a single individual, it
should choose its most preferred alternative. As in our setting we restrain this condition
to jurisdictional rules only, we call it local.
Axiom 2 Local Pareto
If pi|i = {z} ∀i ∈ Jj then fj(σ, pi) = z
When every individual in a jurisdiction votes for the same candidate, that one should
be elected in his jurisdiction. Local Pareto implies Local Faithfulness.
We now turn to the conditions imposed on the federal constitution C as to convey
the different ideas about manipulation by movement.
Axiom 3 Individual Stability
∀pi ∈ An,∀i ∈ N, g(f(σ, pi)) = g(f(σ′, pi)),
for all σ, σ′ ∈ Σ , σ(h) = σ′(h) ∀h 6= i and σ(i) 6= σ′(i)
This property requires that no single voter can affect the outcome alone by changing
jurisdiction (without changing his vote).
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Axiom 4 Stability
∀pi ∈ An, g(f(σ, pi)) = g(f(σ′, pi)) ∀σ, σ′ ∈ Σ
Stability is a generalized version of Individual Stability. It states that no coalition
of voters can change the result of a federal election by simply changing jurisdictions.
Therefore, the result of the election should be independent from the partition of the in-
dividuals. Recall that the framework considered in order to define federal constitutions
departs from the traditional arrovian framework, by the fact that the voting procedure
depends on the partition of the individuals. Thus Stability is a condition such that this
non arrovian framework coincides with the arrovian one.
As a logical negation, one can define the corresponding Individual Instability axiom,
according to which there exists at least one vote profile such that one individual can
change the outcome of the election on its own by changing jurisdiction. Similarly, we
can define the corresponding Instability axiom by saying that a federal constitution C
is unstable if and only if it is not stable, i.e. there is at least one vote profile such that
a group of voters can change the result by changing their voting jurisdictions.
In line with the instability axioms, we define the two manipulability axioms:
Axiom 5 Individual Manipulability
∃ pi ∈ An,∃ i ∈ N, ∃ σ, σ′ ∈ Σ satisfying σ(h) = σ′(h) ∀h 6= i and σ(i) 6= σ′(i) :
g(f(σ′, pi)) Âi g(f(σ, pi))
With Individual Manipulability, not only can a single voter change the outcome of an
election by changing jurisdiction, he can also do that in his favor. Said differently,
g(f(σ, pi)) is not a Nash Equilibrium in the game where strategies are given by the
choice of a jurisdiction.
Axiom 6 Manipulability
∃pi ∈ An,∃G ⊂ N, ∃σ, σ′ ∈ Σ satisfying σ(h) = σ′(h) ∀h /∈ G and σ(i) 6= σ′(i) ∀i ∈ G :
g(f(σ′, pi)) Âi g(f(σ, pi)) ∀i ∈ G
When a constitution is manipulable, coalitions of voters can change the result of a
federal election by changing jurisdictions and they can do it in the favor of all the
members of the coalition. g(f(σ, pi)) is not a Nash Equilibrium with respect to coalition
movements.
The following theorem shows how the concepts of stability and manipulability relate
one with the other.
Theorem 1 For any set of candidates A, a constitution C is unstable if and only if it
is individually manipulable.
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Proof of Theorem 1 : 1- A constitution C is individually unstable if and only if
it is individually manipulable : if C is individually unstable, then ∃pi ∈ An ∃i ∈ N,
∃σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, satisfying σ(i) 6= σ′(i) and σ(h) = σ′(h) ∀h 6= i and g(f(σ, pi)) 6= g(f(σ′, pi)).
As preferences are linear, either g(f(σ, pi)) Âi g(f(σ′, pi)), or the reverse. So individual
i can manipulate g by moving from σ′ to σ or from σ to σ′.
2- A constitution C is individually stable if and only if it is stable: Assume C is indi-
vidually stable, but fails to satisfy Stability. Thus, there exists pi ∈ An and σ, σ′ ∈ Σ
such that g(f(σ, pi)) 6= g(f(σ′, pi)). As n > m, there exists a sequence of partitions,
σ = σ0, σ1, . . . , σk, . . . , σl = σ
′ such that only one voter moves in between σk and σk+1.
At some point in the sequence, we get g(σk, pi) 6= g(σk+1, pi), a contradiction. ¥
It can seem undesirable that a coalition of voters who do not change their votes but
who change jurisdictions could invert the result of an election. However, if one does not
feel uncomfortable with that, he might feel uncomfortable with the fact that the result
of an election depends only on the location of one single voter. Theorem 1 states that
these two facts are identical.
2.3 Pivotal Individuals
In every constitution, it seems reasonable to ask for the decision not to be concentrated
in the hand of one unique voter. We express part of this idea with the following
definitions, stating that one individual alone cannot alter the outcome while all the
other individuals vote unanimously for the same candidate.
Before proceeding, we define the Unanimous vote profile piz as the vote profile such
that pi|i = z for all i in N , for any alternative z in A. It follows that pia is the unanimous
vote profile for candidate a, pib is the unanimous vote profile for candidate b etc...
Definition 2 Pivotal individual in piz
Voter i is called pivotal in piz with z ∈ A if ∃ y ∈ A, z 6= y and pi such that pi|i = y and
pi|h = z ∀h ∈ N \ {i} and g(f(σ, piz)) 6= g(f(σ, pi)) ∀σ.
Definition 3 Pivotal individual
Voter i is called pivotal if ∃ z ∈ A such that i is pivotal in piz.
A pivotal individual is thus pivotal for at least one unanimous vote profile. Note
that a pivotal individual i does not have the power to impose his best choice to society,
he can only change the winner on his own by voting for y at some unanimous profile
piz (but his best choice could be a third candidate). Furthermore, a pivotal individual
is defined only with respect to cases for which all other individual are unanimous on
candidate z. Hence a pivot in piz might not be able to change the outcome of the
election if at least one other voter votes for another candidate than z. Being pivotal is
thus not equivalent to having a veto power.
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3 A Result on Stable Constitutions
In this section the main theorem of the paper is presented. It says that any constitution
satisfying Stability and Local Pareto necessarily gives the power to every elector of being
pivotal, unless it is the Constant Constitution, which definition is provided below.
Definition 4 Constant Constitution
A constitution C = (g, f1, . . . , fm) is called constant if there exists z ∈ A such that
∀σ ∈ Σ, ∀pi ∈ An, g(f(σ, pi)) = z
A Constant Constitution is a voting rule such that, whatever the results of the ju-
risdiction elections, the federal winner is always the same. These rules are totally
independent from the electors. A Constant Constitution is a large class of rules, as it
is defined irrespective of the properties satisfied by the jurisdictional rules fj as well as
of the properties of the federal rule g. Among others we define the following subclass:
Definition 5 LP Constant Constitution
A federal constitution C is LP constant if it is a Constant Constitution for which every
jurisdiction rule fj satisfies Local Pareto.
We now turn to some preliminary propositions which will be useful to state and
prove the main theorem.
Proposition 1 Let A contain any finite number p of alternatives. Assume a federal
constitution C = (g, f1, . . . , fm) satisfies Local Pareto and Stability. If one individual is
pivotal in piaj then every individual is pivotal in piaj .
Proof of Proposition 1 : Assume that individual i is pivotal in piaj by voting for
candidate ak. Consider the vote profile pi where every individual votes for aj ex-
cept individual i who votes for ak, and the partition σ such that J1 = {i}. Then
g(f(σ, piaj)) 6= g(f(σ, pi)) where, by Local Pareto, g(f(σ, pi)) = g(ak, aj, . . . , aj). Con-
sider then the vote profile pi′ where every individual votes for aj except individual
h who votes for ak, and the partition σ
′ such that J1 = {h}. Then g(f(σ, pi)) =
g(ak, aj, . . . , aj) = g(f(σ
′, pi′)) and hence g(f(σ′, pi′)) 6= g(f(σ, piaj)). But Stability im-
plies that g(f(σ′, pi′)) = g(f(σ, pi′)). Thus individual h is also pivotal in piaj . ¥
Proposition 2 Let A contain any finite number p of alternatives. Assume a federal
constitution C = (g, f1, . . . , fm) satisfies Local Pareto and Stability. For any two federal
profiles Π and Π′ ∈ Am such that Π and Π′ both contain the same s different alternatives,
with s < m, then g(Π) = g(Π′).
Proof of Proposition 2 :
The case m = 2 is trivial as necesarily s = 1.
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Consider m > 2 and assume, without loss of generality, that the federal profile Π
contains the s alternatives a1 to as. Because s < m, the federal profile Π has at least
one alternative that is present more than once. Consider any federal profile Π′ such
that Π′|j = Π|j for all j 6= k and Π′|k 6= Π|k, and such that Π′ contains also the same
s different alternatives a1 to as. Hence only one coordinate has changed from Π to Π
′,
and both profiles have exactly the same number of different alternatives. For instance,
assume Πex = a1, a2, . . . , as−1, as, as, . . . as.
Then Π′ex = a1, a2, . . . , as−1, as, as, . . . as, a1 is such a federal profile, while Π
′
ex2 =
as, a2, . . . , as−1, as, as, . . . as, as is not (there are only s−1 different alternatives in Π′ex2).
We first show that for two such profiles, g(Π) = g(Π′). In order to construct Π′, it
is necessary that the alternative that has been changed in Π is present more than once
in Π. Assume, without loss of generality, that Π = Πex and Π
′ = Π′ex, thus in Jm, the
alternative as has been replaced by alternative a1. Consider the individuals vote profile
pi in which two individuals vote for a1, every alternative a2 to as−1 receives one vote
and the n − s remaining individuals vote for as. This vote profile, with two adequate
partitions σ and σ′, can generate both the profiles Π and Π′. Indeed, consider σ such
that the two individuals voting for a1 are together in J1, the jurisdictions J2 to Js−1 are
singletons formed respectively of the individual voting for a2 to that voting for as−1,
and jurisdictions Js to Jm are filled with the individuals voting for as. Using Local
Pareto, this partition generates the federal profile Πex. Consider then the partition σ
′
such that J1 is a singleton formed of one of the a1 voters, jurisdictions J2 to Jm−1 do
not change, and Jm is a singleton formed of the second a1 voter. Using Local Pareto
again, this partition generates the federal profile Π′ex.
In both cases, the individuals vote profile is the same, as only the partition has
changed. Therefore, using Stability, we have
g(a1, a2, . . . , as−1, as, as, . . . as) = g(a1, a2, . . . , as−1, as, as, . . . a1)
As a general result, any federal profiles Π and Π′ such that Π′|j = Π|j for all j 6= k
and Π′|k 6= Π|k, and such that Π′ has the same number s of different alternatives, both
elect the same winner.
In order to conclude, we use the fact that any federal profile Π′, containing exactly
s different alternatives, can be obtained starting from Π, another federal profile con-
taining exactly the same s different alternatives, by a sequence of replacements of one
alternative by another, each of these replacements leaving the new federal profile with
exactly the s same different alternatives. ¥
Before stating and proving the main theorem of this section, one more intermediate
proposition is given. It says that when the constitution C satisfies Local Pareto and
Stability, then the federal social choice function g is anonymous. Let us first define
anonymity.
Axiom 7 Federal Anonymity
A federal social choice function g : Am −→ A satisfies anonymity if and only if g(Π) =
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g(µ(Π)) where Π is a federal vote profile (f1(σ, pi), . . . , fm(σ, pi)) in A
m and µ is a
permutation on {1, . . . ,m}
Federal Anonymity is an axiom stating that any change in the name of the jurisdictions
leaves the result unchanged. No jurisdiction has more power than another.
Proposition 3 Let A contain any finite number p of alternatives. Consider a consti-
tution C = (g, f1, . . . , fm) which satisfies Stability and Local Pareto. Then g satisfies
Federal Anonymity.
Proof of Proposition 3 :
Given Local Pareto, it is possible to generate any federal profile Π by forming homoge-
nous partitions, for which any individual in Jj votes for Π|j.
Any permutation µ on the name of the jurisdictions generates a federal profile µ(Π)
that can be obtained as the result of the corresponding permutation on the set of in-
dividuals, i.e. the partition σ′ such that σ(i) = j and µ(j) = j′ =⇒ σ′(i) = j′. Since
C satisfies Stability, g(f(σ, pi)) = g(f(σ′, pi)). Consequently, g(Π) = g(µ(Π)), so g is
anonymous. ¥
The theorem can now be stated.
Theorem 2 Let A contain any finite number p of alternatives. If a constitution C =
(g, f1, . . . , fm) satisfies Stability and Local Pareto then C is either a LP Constant Con-
stitution or in C every individual is pivotal.
Proof of Theorem 2:
The sketch goes as follows. We assume that in C, no individual is pivotal, although C
satisfies Local Pareto and Stability. This will imply that C can only be a LP Constant
Constitution. This implication, said differently, also states that if a federal constitution
C satisfies Stability, Local Pareto and is not a LP Constant Constitution, then in C
there is at least one pivotal individual. By proposition 1, the theorem will then be
proved.
The proof is led by induction over natural numbers. First we show that all the
possible federal profiles containing only one or two alternatives give the same winner,
which we call z. Next we assume that any federal profile containing s or less different
alternatives, s < m, also gives z as the winner and we show that this implies that any
federal profile containing s+1 different alternatives gives z as the winner of the election.
A last argument will then be given to show that it is unnecessary to go beyond s ≥ m.
Assume thus that C satisfies Local Pareto, Stability, and no individual is pivotal.
Consider any alternative aj. The vote profile piaj is such that every individual votes
for candidate aj, leading by Local Pareto to g(f(σ, piaj)) = g(aj, . . . , aj). Call this
winner z and consider the vote profile such that every elector votes for aj, except one
who votes for any other alternative ak. Consider the partition σ
′ such that the ak
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voter is alone in the last jurisdiction Jm. By Local Pareto, this vote profile leads to
g(aj, . . . , aj, ak) and as it is assumed that no individual is pivotal, this implies that
g(aj, . . . , aj, ak) = g(aj, . . . , aj) = z.
Given proposition 2, this implies that any federal profile containing alternatives aj
and ak yields z as the winner. Thus,
g(aj, . . . , aj) = . . . g(aj, . . . , aj, ak, . . . , ak) = . . . = g(aj, ak, . . . , ak)
Furthermore, this last term of the above equality can be generated by the voting profile
in which every individual votes for ak except individual 1 who votes for aj, if indi-
vidual 1 is put alone in jurisdiction J1. But again, no individual is pivotal, so that
when individual 1 changes his vote to ak, the result of the election is still z. Hence,
g(ak, . . . , ak) = z.
We have shown that for any candidate aj, if the winner associated to the unanimous
vote profile piaj is z, then any unanimous vote profile piak should elect z, as well as any
federal profile containing exactly two different alternatives.
Assume now that the result of the election is z whenever there are s or less different
alternatives in the federal profile, with s < m. Consider the vote profile such that one
individual votes for a1, one individual votes for a2, one individual votes for a3, . . . ,
one individual votes for as−2, n − s individuals vote for alternative as−1 and finally
the two last individuals vote for any alternative ai, with ai ∈ {a1, . . . as−1}. Forming
homogeneous jurisdictions and using Local Pareto, this particular vote profile generates
the federal profile g(a1, a2, . . . , as−2, as−1, . . . , as−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−s+1
, ai). This federal profile contains s−1
different alternatives, so according to the hypothesis, the winner is z. Hence
g(a1, a2, . . . , as−2, as−1, . . . , as−1, ai) = z for any ai ∈ {a1, . . . as−1}
Next, when the last two individuals vote for the same alternative aj with aj ∈
{as, . . . ap}, the federal profile generated is g(a1, a2, . . . , as−2, as−1, . . . , as−1, ai), which
contains s different alternatives, so by hypothesis, the winner is still z. Hence
g(a1, a2, . . . , as−2, as−1, . . . , as−1, aj) = z for any aj ∈ {as, . . . ap}
Summarizing,
g(a1, a2, . . . , as−2, as−1, . . . , as−1, fm) = z whatever the value of fm
Consider now the same partition of the individuals, and assume the last two indi-
viduals vote respectively for as and as+1. We have no information about the outcome
of the last jurisdiction, as Local Pareto does not apply. However, this vote profile will
generate a federal profile of the form g(a1, a2, . . . , as−2, as−1, . . . , as−1, fm) which will
give z as the winner, as just stated above. Hence there is one individual vote profile
containing s+ 1 different candidates for which the winner is still z.
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This specific vote profile, which contains s+1 alternatives, can now be used with a
different partition: the first s−2 jurisdictions are the same, i.e. they are singletons. The
jurisdictions Js−1 to Jm−2 are filled with the n− s electors voting for as−1, jurisdiction
Jm−1 is a singleton formed by the as voter and last, Jm is a singleton formed by the
as+1 voter. Using Local Pareto, this vote profile and this partition generate the federal
profile
g(a1, a2, . . . , as−2, as−1, . . . , as−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−s
, as, as+1)
Notice that the vote profile has not changed, only the partition has changed. Therefore,
according to Stability, the winner is still z. Thus there is a federal profile containing
s+ 1 alternatives, and this profile gives z as the winner.
There are two possibilities here: s+1 < m or s+1 = m. In the first case, proposition
2 helps us conclude, as we will then have z as the winner whenever there are s+1 different
alternatives at the federal level. In the second case, there are as much alternatives as
jurisdictions, so that every jurisdiction elects a different candidate. Proposition 3 states
that g is anonymous, implying that all the possible federal profiles give the same winner.
What remains to prove is the case where s ≥ m. Notice, however, that any vote
profile containing p alternatives, with p > m, will generate a federal profile containing
no more than m alternatives. Proposition 3 thus helps us concluding.
As a consequence, we have shown that for any set of candidates A = {a1, . . . , ap},
if C satisfies Local Pareto, Stability, and has no pivotal individual, then all the possi-
ble federal profiles give the same winner. Therefore, the federal constitution is a LP
Constant Constitution. ¥
Although this result is not complete, as there is no exact characterization given of
stable voting rules, theorem 2 is sufficient in order to give a negative answer to the
question raised in this paper, that of the existence of non-manipulable constitutions.
No matter what exact set of rules is defined, they all share a crucial weakness, that of
letting every individual be pivotal.
As mentioned, the theorem does not give an entire characterization of the set of
rules that do allow for Stability along with Local Pareto. This characterization is, we
believe, unnecessary to stress out that manipulation is a possible byproduct of two stage
elections, as pivotal individuals are undesirable enough. However, it seems interesting to
provide some examples of rules other than the Constant Constitution which are stable.
For that purpose, the specific case of two candidates is examined in the following.
4 The case of two candidates
In this section we restrain our analysis to the case of two candidates, A = {a, b}.
In what remains we use the following notation : pi0 = pia is the unanimous profile for
a, pil1...lkk denotes the vote profile such that individuals l1, . . . , lk have switched their vote
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to b, while individuals lk+1, . . . , ln still vote for a. Ultimately we have pi
l1...ln
n = pin = pib,
the profile such that every voter votes for b.
4.1 Local Pareto
In this section we give a characterization of the set of rules which satisfy both Stability
and Local Pareto. To do this, we first define what we call the class of Unanimity Rules.
As to be more formal, we use the following notation: when z ∈ A is either one of
the two candidates, we denote by z¯ his opponent. For instance, if z = b, then z¯ denotes
a.
Definition 6 Unanimity Rule
Let (x, z) ∈ A2. A federal constitution is a Unanimity Rule (x, z) if :
- ∀ Jj, [∀ i ∈ Jj pi|i = x =⇒ fj(σ, pi) = x] and [∃h ∈ Jj, pi|h = x¯ =⇒ fj(σ, pi) = x¯]
- [∀Jj ∈ J , fj(σ, pi) = x =⇒ g(f(σ, pi)) = z] and [∃Jj′ ∈ J , fj′(σ, pi) = x¯ =⇒
g(f(σ, pi)) = z¯].
In words, a unanimity rule is such that at both the jurisdictional and the federal levels,
unanimity is required for one candidate to be elected while his opponent wins in all
other cases. As A = {a, b}, Unanimity Rule is a class of four rules only: Unanimity
Rule (a, a); Unanimity Rule (a, b); Unanimity Rule (b, a) and Unanimity Rule (b,
b). For instance, Unanimity Rule (a, a) is such that in every jurisdiction, if a receives
unanimity then a is elected at the jurisdiction level, otherwise b is. At the federal level,
if a is unanimous then a is the winner, otherwise b is. Therefore, when every individual
votes for a, the federal winner is a. In any other case, the federal winner is b.
In turn, Unanimity Rule (b, a) is such that a is elected as the final winner if and only
if everyone votes for b. In any other case, b is elected.
We now turn to the characterization theorem.
Theorem 3 When A = {a, b}, a federal constitution C = (g, f1, . . . , fm) satisfies Local
Pareto and Stability if and only if C is a LP Constant Constitution or is a Unanimity
Rules.
Proof of Theorem 3 :
• Implication ⇐=
By definition, the LP Constant Constitution is stable and satisfies Local Pareto.
Unanimity Rule is a class of rules that satisfy Local Pareto. Moreover they satisfy
Stability. Indeed, if unanimity is required for x and voter i is a x voter, then when he
changes jurisdiction, it does neither affect the jurisdiction he left nor the jurisdiction he
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is arriving in. If voter i is a x¯ voter, then the jurisdiction he left may become unanimous
about x, but the one he arrives in will not be. In any case the winner of the election
will remain the same.
• Implication =⇒
Assume C satisfies Local Pareto and Stability. Then, according to theorem 2, we know
that C is either the LP Constant Constitution or in C, every individual is pivotal.
Notice that any vote profile containing both options a and b can yield, using Local
Pareto and building homogenous partitions, to federal profiles containing both options.
We can thus use Proposition 2 to state that
g(f(σ, pil11 )) = . . . = g(f(σ, pi
l1...ln−1
n−1 )) = z
Hence not only every federal profile containing both options give the same winner, it is
also true for every vote profile. The only remaining vote profiles for which nothing can
be said are pi0 and pi
l1...ln
n . Recalling that whenever z is either of the two candidates, z¯
denotes his opponent, there are four possible cases:
(1) g(f(σ, pi0)) = z and g(f(σ, pi
l1...ln
n )) = z;
(2) g(f(σ, pi0)) = z and g(f(σ, pi
l1...ln
n )) = z¯;
(3) g(f(σ, pi0)) = z¯ and g(f(σ, pi
l1...ln
n )) = z;
(4) g(f(σ, pi0)) = z¯ and g(f(σ, pi
l1...ln
n )) = z¯.





not possible that we are in two different cases. This is the consequence of proposition 1
according to which the existence of one pivotal individual implies that every individual
is pivotal.
We show here that case (4) cannot hold. Assume there exists a sequence l1 . . . ln such
that g(f(σ, pi0)) = z¯, g(f(σ, pi
l1
1 )) = z, . . . , g(f(σ, pi
l1...ln−1
n−1 )) = z and g(f(σ, pi
l1...ln
n )) = z¯.
Consider any partition σ such that Jm = {l1, ln}. Using Local Pareto, g(f(σ, pi0)) =
g(a, . . . , a, a) = z¯. In pil11 , now, we have g(f(σ, pi
l1
1 )) = g(a, . . . , a, fm) = z. Hence,
necessarily, fm = b.
Now let all the other individuals switch their votes. We will achieve g(f(σ, pi
l1...ln−1
n−1 )) =
g(b, . . . , b, fm) = g(b, . . . , b) = z and this is a contradiction given that g(f(σ, pi
l1...ln
n )) =
g(b, . . . , b) = z¯. Hence there is no sequence such as case (4).
We have shown that for any sequence l1, . . . , ln we necessarily have case (1), (2) or
(3). In case (1) the outcome remains constant throughout the sequence while in cases
(2) and (3) all individuals are pivotal. Case (1) is a Constant Constitution and Local
Pareto is satisfied so it is a LP Constant Constitution. It remains proving that cases
(2) and (3) generate the four possible Unanimity Rules.
Consider that every sequence is in case (3). Given Local Pareto, we know that
in pi0 we get g(f(σ, pi0)) = g(a, . . . , a) = z¯ ∀σ. Consider σ such that the m − 1 first
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jurisdictions are singletons and the last one is filled with all the remaining voters.
Then, in pil11 we get g(f(σ, pi
l1
1 )) = g(b, a, . . . , a) = z. According to proposition 3, g
is anonymous, so that whenever the federal profile has one jurisdiction in which b is
elected, while all the others elect a, then the federal winner is z.
We also get g(f(σ, pil1l22 )) = g(b, b, a, . . . , a) = z. Again, Federal Anonymity says
that whenever the federal profile is formed of two b’s and m − 2 a’s, the winner is z.
Going on until pim−1 we reach g(b, . . . , b, a) = z. By Federal Anonymity, whenever the
profile is formed of m− 1 b’s and one a, the winner is z
Finally, in pin we have g(b, . . . , b, b) = z. Hence the only possibility for z¯ to win the
election is for profile pi0. That means that z¯ can win only if every jurisdiction votes for
a and if every voter of the jurisdiction votes for a. That rule is thus either Unanimity
Rule (a, a) or Unanimity Rule (a, b), according to the value of z.
In the same way, case (2) will lead to Unanimity Rule (b, a) and Unanimity Rule
(b, b). ¥
Remark 2 Although it was not a specific requirement, the rules characterized in The-
orem 3, if not in the set of the LP Constant Constitution, all have in common that the
rules at the jurisdiction level are identical, i.e. fj = fj′ for all j, j
′.
4.2 Local Faithfulness
In this subsection, the consequences of weakening the Local Pareto condition into the
Local Faithfulness one are explored. Trivially, Local Faithfulness is satisfied whenever
Local Pareto is assumed, but the reverse is not true. Indeed, Local Faithfulness says
that in the case a jurisdiction is a singleton, the choice of the jurisdiction should be
the choice of the individual composing it. Yet Local Faithfulness keeps silent on what
happens in jurisdictions with at least two individuals.
We now define two other classes of rules in order to state the theorem.
Definition 7 LF Constant Constitution
A federal constitution C is LF constant if it is a Constant Constitution for which every
jurisdiction rule fj satisfies Local Faithfulness.
Next we define what we call the class of Parity Rules. In words, a parity rule is such
that at both the jurisdictional and the federal levels, the winner is designated uniquely
by the parity of the votes he or his opponent receives.
Definition 8 The Parity Rule
Let (x, y, z) ∈ A3. A federal constitution is a Parity Rule (x, y, z) if:
- in every jurisdiction, if the number of voters for candidate x is odd, then x is the
jurisdiction winner. If that number is even then x¯ wins.
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- at the federal level, if the number of jurisdictions that have chosen y is odd, then
z is the winner. If that number is even, then z¯ is the winner.
This class of rules may look rather peculiar and has, to the best of our knowledge,
never been studied. It bases the election on the parity of the votes. As A = {a, b},
Parity Rule is a class of eight rules: Parity Rule (a,a,a); Parity Rule (a,a,b); Parity
Rule (a,b,a); Parity Rule (b,a,a); Parity Rule (a,b,b); Parity Rule (b,a,b); Parity Rule
(b,b,a) and Parity Rule (b,b,b).
For instance, Parity Rule (a,b,a) is the following: in every jurisdiction, if the number
of votes for a is odd then a is the winner in the jurisdiction, otherwise b is. At the
federal level, if the number of jurisdictions that voted for b is odd, then a is the winner,
otherwise b is. As a matter of illustration of this rule, assume N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, m = 3
and the partition of society is given by σ such that J1 = {1}, J2 = {2}, J3 = {3, 4}. For
the unanimous vote profile pia, we obtain f1(σ, pia) = a, f2(σ, pia) = a, f3(σ, pia) = b and
thus g(f(σ, pia)) = a, as the number of jurisdictions voting for b is odd. In pi
3
1 (i.e. the
profile such that everyone votes for a except individual 3 who votes for b), we obtain
f1(σ, pi
3
1) = a, f2(σ, pi
3
1) = a, f3(σ, pi
3
1) = a and thus g(f(σ, pi
3
1)) = b. In pi
3,4
2 we obtain
g(f(σ, pi3,42 )) = a, then g(f(σ, pi
2,3,4
3 )) = b and g(f(σ, pib)) = a
One interesting feature of this class of rules is, as we will see further in more details,
that every time an elector changes his vote, he changes the outcome of the election.
Thus if another individual changes his vote at the same time they both neutralise
themselves.
A few preliminary lemmas and propositions are needed, all of them being based on
the following assumption:
Assumption Ak : Assume that the constitution C is such that there exists a k,
2 ≤ k < n, such that for any k′, k′ ≤ k, we have g(f(σ, pil1...lk′k′ )) = z for any sequence
of individuals l1, . . . , lk′ that have switched their vote from alternative a to alternative b.
Assume furthermore that there exists an individual lk+1 such that g(f(σ, pi
l1...lk+1
k+1 )) = z¯.
We are thus assuming that the constitution always gives the same winner, until k + 1
individuals have changed their vote. We then have the following:
Lemma 1 Given assumption Ak, if σ(lk+1) = j, fj(σ, pi
l1...lk+1
k+1 ) 6= fj(σ, pil1...lkk )
When he changes his vote from a to b, voter lk+1 changes the result of any jurisdiction
he belongs to.








k+1 )) = g(fj(σ, pi
l1...lk+1





k+1 ), f−j(σ, pi
l1...lk
k )) by Jurisdiction Sovereignty
= g(fj(σ, pi
l1...lk
k ), f−j(σ, pi
l1...lk
k ))
= g(f(σ, pil1...lkk )) = z, a contradiction with Ak.
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¥Lemma 2 Given assumption Ak, if σ(lk+1) = σ(lk) = j, fj(σ, pi
l1...lk
k ) = fj(σ, pi
l1,...lk−1
k−1 ).
When voting in the same jurisdiction as lk+1, voter lk could not change the result of his
jurisdiction Jj.
Proof of Lemma 2: Assume the contrary. fj(σ, pi
l1...lk
k ) 6= fj(σ, pil1...lk−1k−1 ). Thus, by
Lemma 1, fj(σ, pi
l1...lk+1





k+1 )) = g(fj(σ, pi
l1...lk+1





k+1 ), f−j(σ, pi
l1...lk−1
k−1 )) by Jurisdiction Sovereignty
= g(fj(σ, pi
l1...lk−1





k−1 )) = z, a contradiction with Ak.
¥
Lemma 3 Given assumption Ak, if j = σ(lk+1) 6= σ(lk) = j′, fj′(σ, pil1...lkk ) 6= fj′(σ, pil1...lk−1k−1 ).
When voting in a different jurisdiction than lk+1, voter lk changes the result of his
jurisdiction by changing his vote from a to b.
Proof of Lemma 3: Assume the contrary, fj′(σ, pi
l1...lk





k+1 )) = g(fj′(σ, pi
l1...lk+1





k ), f−j′(σ, pi
l1...lk−1lk+1
k ) by Jurisdiction Sovereignty
= g(fj′(σ, pi
l1...lk−1





k ), f−j′(σ, pi
l1...lk−1lk+1




But l1 . . . lk−1, lk+1 forms a sequence of k individuals who have switched their preference.
So by assumption Ak, g(f(σ, pi
l1...lk−1lk+1
k )) = z, a contradiction. ¥
Proposition 4 Let A = {a, b}. If a federal constitution C = (g, f1, . . . , fm) satisfies
Local Faithfulness and Stability, for any k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 2, assumption Ak cannot hold.
Proof of Proposition 4
We divide this proof into two steps. First we show that the proposition holds for
any k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1. Recall that n ≥ m + 1 by assumption. Therefore, in the case
n = m+1, the proof will be finished at this stage. However, in the case where n > m+1,
we will need to show in a second step that the proposition holds for any k,m ≤ k ≤ n−2
First step: Let us assume that k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1 and assumption Ak holds. The
three lemmas can then be applied.
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Consider the sequence l1 . . . lk+1 such that g(f(σ, pi
l1...lk′
k′ )) = g(f(σ, pi
l1...lk
k )) = z
for any k′ < k and g(f(σ, pil1...lk+1k+1 )) = z¯. Let σ be the partition such that J1 =
{l1}, . . . , Jk−1 = {lk−1}, the jurisdictions Jk, . . . , Jm−1 are singletons of a voters, and
Jm is filled with lk, lk+1 and all the remaining a voters. (In the case where k = 1 then
J1, . . . , Jm−1 are singletons of a voters, and Jm is filled with l1, l2 and all the remaining
a voters.)
In σ, voters lk and lk+1 are together in the same jurisdiction. We can thus state, using
Local Faithfulness and the three lemmas :
At pi
l1...lk−1
k−1 : g(b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
, a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−k
, fm) = z
At pil1...lkk : g(b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
, a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−k
, fm) = z by Lemma 2
At pi
l1...lk+1
k+1 : g(b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
, a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−k
f¯m) = z¯ by Lemma 1
As a consequence,
g(b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
, a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−k+1
) 6= g(b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
, a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−k
, b)
Consider now the partition σ′ such that J1 = {l1}, . . . , Jk−1 = {lk−1}, Jk = {lk+1},
the jurisdictions Jk+1, . . . , Jm−1 are singletons of a voters, and Jm is filled with lk and
all the remaining a voters. (In the case where k = 1 then J1 = {l2}, J2, . . . , Jm−1 are
singletons of a voters, and Jm is filled with l1 and all the remaining a voters.)
In σ′, voters lk and lk+1 are separated in different jurisdictions. We can thus state,
using Local Faithfulness and the three lemmas :
At pi
l1...lk−1
k−1 : g(b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
, a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−k
, f ′m) = z
At pil1...lkk : g(b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
, a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−k
, f¯ ′m) = z by Lemma 3
As a consequence,
g(b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
, a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−k+1
) = g(b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−k
, b)
which contradicts with the conclusion obtained for σ.
However, for k ≥ m the partition σ′ cannot be constructed as there are only m
jurisdictions in the federation. We need thus proceed differently.
Second step: Let us assume that k,m ≤ k ≤ n − 2 and assumption Ak holds. The
proof follows the same lines as that of the first step using different partitions.
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Using partition σ such that J1 = {l1}, . . . , Jm−2 = {lm−2}, Jm−1 = {ln} and Jm is
filled with lm−1, . . . , lk, lk+1 and all the remaining a voters, one can apply lemmas 1 and
2 as to show that
g(b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−2
, a, a) 6= g(b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−2
, a, b)
Considering next the partition σ′ such that J1 = {l1}, . . . , Jm−2 = {lm−2}, Jm−1 =
{lk+1}, and Jm is filled with lm−1, lm, . . . , lk and all the remaining a voters, one can
apply lemma 3 as to obtain
g(b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−2




Before turning to the theorem, we need this last proposition:
Proposition 5 Let A = {a, b}. If C satisfies Stability and Local Faithfulness and has
at least one pivotal individual, then every individual is pivotal.
Proof of Proposition 5 : Assume individual l1 is pivotal in pia. Thus g(f(σ, pi0)) = z
and g(f(σ, pil11 )) = z¯. Pick any individual, say li, and assume he is not pivotal in pia.
Let σ be the partition such that J1 = {l1}, jurisdictions J2 to Jm−1 are filled with a
single voter (different from li) and Jm is filled with individual li together with all the
remaining voters. Using Local Faithfulness, we get g(f(σ, pi0)) = g(a, a, . . . , a, fm) = z
and g(f(σ, pil11 )) = g(b, a, . . . , a, fm) = z¯.
Now consider partition σ′ such that individuals l1 and li are inverted : J1 = {li} and
Jm is filled with individual l1 and the remaining voters. Using Stability, g(f(σ
′, pi0)) = z
and by Local Faithfulness, g(f(σ′, pi0)) = g(a, a, . . . , a, f ′m) = z. Individual l1 being
pivotal, we still have g(f(σ, pil11 )) = z¯, so necessarily, g(a, a, . . . , a, f¯
′
m) = z¯. To avoid
a contradiction, it is necessary that fm 6= f¯ ′m, so we can deduce that f ′m = fm. Hence
g(f(σ′, pi0) = z.
Finally, consider the profile pili1 where individual li only has changed his vote. For
the partition σ′ we get g(f(σ′, pili1 )) = g(b, a, . . . , a, fm), and this, as we just have seen,
is equal to z¯. Therefore individual li is also pivotal in pia. And this is true ∀li. ¥
We can now state and prove the theorem 4.
Theorem 4 When A = {a, b}, a federal constitution C = (g, f1, . . . , fm) satisfies Local
Faithfulness and Stability if and only if C is either an LF Constant Constitution, a
Unanimity Rule or a Parity Rule.
Proof of Theorem 4:
• Implication ⇐=
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By definition, the LF Constant Constitution class is stable and satisfies Local Faith-
fulness. Unanimity Rule is a class of rules that all satisfy Local Faithfulness (as they
satisfy Local Pareto). Moreover they also satisfy Stability.
Parity Rule is a class of rules that satisfies Local Faithfulness. Indeed, when a
voter is alone, his parity is odd so his candidate wins in his jurisdiction. The class also
satisfies Stability. To see this, simply notice that when a voter changes jurisdiction,
his movement has two effects: it changes the parity of the jurisdiction he was in and it
changes the parity of the jurisdiction he arrives in. Thus two jurisdictions change votes
and therefore the parity at the federal level does not change. The rule is thus stable.
• Implication =⇒
Assume C, a federal constitution, satisfies Local Faithfulness and Stability. Proposition
4 can then be applied, and hence assumption Ak cannot hold for any k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 2.
Let us analyse what the negation of Assumption Ak implies.
• Either g(f(σ, pi0)) = z and ∃ l1 such that g(f(σ, pil11 )) = z¯. Then individual l1 is
pivotal in pia.
• Or g(f(σ, pi0)) = g(f(σ, pil11 )) = z for any l1. Then necessarily g(f(σ, pil1l22 )) = z
for any sequence l1, l2,..., g(f(σ, pi
l1...ln−1
n−1 )) = z for any sequence l1, . . . ln−1. There
are then two subcases. Either g(f(σ, pin)) = z¯ and then necessarily individual ln is
pivotal in pib. Or g(f(σ, pin)) = z and then C is a Constant Constitution satisfying
Local Faithfulness.
Thus either C is an LF Constant Constitution or in C, there is at least one pivotal
individual, which in turn implies, according to proposition 5, that every individual is
pivotal.
Notice that the reasoning we just held can also be made when starting from the
profile pin where all individuals vote for b, and going towards pi0. We thus have the
following: if for any sequence l1 . . . ln−1, g(f(σ, pin)) = g(f(σ, pi
l1...ln−1
n−1 )) = z, then
g(f(σ, pi
l1,...ln−2
n−2 )) = . . . = g(f(σ, pi
l1
1 )) = z.
We next proceed to the determination of the set of all the rules such that every in-
dividual is pivotal. Before doing so, however, it is usefull to give the lines of what
follows. We know that if no individual is pivotal, we are left with the Constant Con-
stitution. Indeed, the difficult case arises when all individuals are pivotal. We are thus
confronted with two possible cases when considering all possible vote profiles from pi0
to pin: either the result of the election changes only once in that sequence, or it changes
more than once. In the first case we will be left with the Unanimity Rules, while in
the second, only the Parity Rules will remain. All cases are considered below, however,
before analysing what possible rules are generated, we point out the following property:
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If there exists a pair of individuals li, lh such that g(f(σ, pi0)) = z, g(f(σ, pi
li
1 )) = z¯
and g(f(σ, pililh2 )) = z¯, then we have g(f(σ, pi
lkll
2 )) = z¯ ∀lk, ll ∈ N .
To see this, assume g(f(σ, pi0)) = z and g(f(σ, pi
li
1 )) = z¯ ∀li ∈ N . Assume furthermore
that there exists two individuals li and lh such that g(f(σ, pi
lilh
2 )) = z¯. Consider then
the partition σ such that J1 = {li} and individuals lh and lk are together in jurisdiction
J2. We get:
g(f(σ, pi0)) = g(a, f2, f3, . . . , fm) = z
g(f(σ, pili1 )) = g(b, f2, f3, . . . , fm) = z¯
As individual li is pivotal, then lh and lk are as well, according to proposition 5. This
implies that lh and lk change the outcome of their jurisdiction when they switch votes.
g(f(σ, pilh1 )) = g(a, f¯2, f3, . . . , fm) = z¯
g(f(σ, pilk1 )) = g(a, f¯2, f3, . . . , fm) = z¯
From that we can derive that g(f(σ, pililh2 )) = g(b, f¯2, f3, . . . , fm) = z¯.
But we also have g(f(σ, pililk2 )) = g(b, f¯2, f3, . . . , fm) and thus g(f(σ, pi
lilk
2 )) = z¯.
Summarizing, if g(f(σ, pililh2 )) = z¯ then g(f(σ, pi
lilk
2 )) = z¯ for any lk. Hence if there
is one common individual in both sequences, as it is the case here with li, then the
outcome in pi2 should be z¯. Therefore, we can derive that if g(f(σ, pi
lilk
2 )) = z¯, then
g(f(σ, pilkll2 )) = z¯, as lk is now a common individual in both sequences. Hence, if there
is one pair of individuals such that g(f(σ, pililh2 )) = z¯, then g(f(σ, pi
lkll
2 )) = z¯ for any
pair of individuals lk, ll. This fact will help us in what follows, as we now analyse the
possible rules that are generated by the fact that every individual is pivotal.
Case 1: assume g(f(σ, pi0)) = g(f(σ, pi
li
1 )) = z ∀li ∈ N . Then according to the nega-
tion of assumption Ak we have g(f(σ, pi
l1...lk
k )) = z, for any sequence of k individuals,
1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
• Case 1a: If g(f(σ, pin)) = z then C is an LF Constant Constitution.
• Case 1b: If g(f(σ, pin)) = z¯ then the outcome of the election is z for any vote
profile except in pin where the outcome is z¯.
Case 2: assume g(f(σ, pi0)) = z and g(f(σ, pi
li
1 )) = z¯ ∀li ∈ N .
• Case 2a: If ∃ lh such that g(f(σ, pililh2 )) = z¯ then according to what has been said
just before, we know that g(f(σ, pilkll2 )) = z¯ ∀ lk, ll ∈ N . We can then apply the
negation of Ak to derive g(f(σ, pi
l1...lk
k )) = z¯, . . . , g(f(σ, pi
l1...ln−1
n−1 )) = z¯.
– Case 2aa: If g(f(σ, pin)) = z¯ then the outcome of the election is z¯ for any
vote profile except in pi0 where the outcome is z. This case is symmetric to
case 1b.
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– Case 2ab: assume g(f(σ, pin)) = z. Then the outcome is z for profiles pi0 and
pin and it is z¯ for any other profile. We show here that this case cannot occur
as it leads to a contradiction. Consider the partition σ such that J1 = {l1},
J2 = {l2}, . . . , Jm−2 = {lm−2}, Jm−1 = {ln} and jurisdiction Jm is filled
with all the n − m + 1 remaining individuals lm−1, . . . , ln−1. Using Local
Faithfulness, we have: g(f(σ, pi0)) = g(a, . . . , a, fm) = z. As every individ-
ual is pivotal, we have g(f(σ, pi
lm−1
1 )) = z¯ so necessarily, g(f(σ, pi
lm−1
1 )) =
g(a, . . . , a, f¯m). As g(f(σ, pi
l1...lk
k )) = z¯ for any k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, in par-
ticular we have g(f(σ, pi
lm−1...ln−1
n−m+1 )) = z¯ so necessarily g(f(σ, pi
lm−1...ln−1
n−m+1 )) =
g(a, . . . , a, f¯m). Hence, when all individuals in jurisdiction Jm change their
vote to b, the jurisdiction votes for f¯m. This implies that for pin we get
g(f(σ, pin)) = g(b, . . . , b, f¯m). Let us step back to the profile pi
l1,...lm−2lnlm−1
m
where every individual that is alone in his jurisdiction has changed his vote
and where only one individual in jurisdiction Jm has changed his. For that
profile, the outcome of the election is by hypothesis z¯. We then have,
using Local Faithfulness, g(f(σ, pil1,...lm−2lnlm−1m )) = g(b, . . . , b, f¯m) = z¯, so
g(f(σ, pin)) = g(b, . . . , b, f¯m) = g(f(σ, pi
l1,...lm−2lnlm−1
m )) = z¯ and this is a con-
tradiction. Hence there is no such case as 2ab.
• Case 2b: For every individual lh we have g(f(σ, pililh2 )) = z
We thus have four cases: case 1a generates the LF Constant Constitutions. We next
show that cases 1b and 2aa generate all the Unanimity Rules while case 2b generates
all Parity Rules.
Cases 1b and 2aa generate all Unanimity Rules
The two cases are symmetric. We will thus show that case 2aa generates Unanimity
Rules (a, a) and (a, b). The same reasoning can then be led to show that case 1b
generates Unanimity Rules (b, a) and (b, b).
Let the partition σ be such that the m− 1 first jurisdictions are singletons and the last
one is filled with all the remaining voters. Then in pi0, using Local Faithfulness, we get
g(f(σ, pi0)) = g(a, . . . , a, fm) = z. We must show that necessarily fm = a. Then it will
follow that the only configuration such that z wins the election is given by the federal
profile Π = a, . . . , a that can only be obtained by the vote profile pi0. All the other vote
profiles make z¯ the winner and therefore, according to the value of z, we will get either
Unanimity Rule (a, a) or Unanimity Rule (a, b).
Assume fm = b. Then g(f(σ, pi0)) = g(a, . . . , a, b) = z and g(f(σ, pi
l1...lk
k )) = z¯ for any
k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Therefore, we have g(f(σ, pilm1 )) = z¯ = g(a, . . . , a, f¯m) = g(a, . . . , a, a).
Let all the voters that are alone change one after the other their vote. This leads us to
g(b, a, . . . , a, a) = g(b, b, a, . . . , a, a) = . . . = g(b, . . . , b, a) = z¯. Hence, any combination
such that jurisdiction Jm votes for a gives z¯ as the winner.
Consider now another partition σ′ such that jurisdiction Jm is a singleton. Then in pi0,
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necessarily jurisdiction Jm chooses a. But we have just seen that all the combinations
such that Jm chooses a give z¯ as the winner, so this implies g(f(σ
′, pi0)) = z¯. This is
thus a contradiction with Stability; the cause of this contradiction is the assumption
that fm = b. Hence fm = a.
Case 2b generates all Parity Rules
Assume without loss of generality that n, the number of electors is odd and we have
g(f(σ, pi0)) = z, g(f(σ, pi
li
1 )) = z¯ ∀i ∈ N and g(f(σ, pililh2 )) = z ∀i, h ∈ N . Consider
the partition σ such that the m − 1 first jurisdictions are singletons and the m-th ju-
risdiction is filled with the n − m + 1 remaining voters. Using Local Faithfulness we
get g(f(σ, pi0)) = g(a, . . . , a, fm) = z. In pi1, we can change any individual’s vote as to
reach
g(f(σ, pili1 )) = g(b, a, ..a, fm) = g(a, ..a, b, a, ..a, fm) = g(a, ..a, b, fm) = g(a, ..a, f¯m) = z¯
Again, in pi2 the outcome is z for any pair li, lh so
g(f(σ, pililh2 )) = g(b, b, a, . . . , a, fm) = g(a, ..a, b, a, ..a, b, a, ..a, fm) = g(a, . . . , a, b, b, fm) = z
Necessarily, if two individuals in jurisdiction m change their vote, then by Stability, the
result in Jm will be fm, so
g(f(σ, pililh2 )) = g(a, . . . , a, fm) = z
Consider then the profile pili,lh,lk3 . As g(f(σ, pi
lilh
2 )) = g(a, . . . , a, fm), if individual lk is
in one of the m− 1 first jurisdictions, then we get
g(f(σ, pili,lh,lk3 )) = g(b, a, . . . , a, fm) = z¯
Hence in pi3 the outcome is z¯, like we had in pi1. Changing the vote of every individual
in turn we get
g(f(σ, pili,lh,lk3 )) = g(b, b, . . . , a, f¯m) = g(b, b, b, a, . . . , a, fm)
and all these give z¯ as the winner, by Stability.
Next we reach pi4 for which the outcome is again changed to z etc...
As to completely characterize the rule we have just described, it remains determin-
ing the value of fm. Assume fm = a. We notice that when the number of b’s present
at the aggregate level is even, the outcome is z, whereas an odd number of b’s yields
z¯ as the winner5. Therefore the rule at the aggregate level is the Parity Rule. In the
same way, we notice that in jurisdiction Jm the outcome depends on the parity of b’s
5We focus on the parity of b’s as a matter of illustration. Of course the same remark can be made
with respect to the parity of a’s at the aggregate level
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(resp. of a’s) in the vote profile of that jurisdiction. Therefore the voting rule in Jm is
the Parity Rule. Finally, it is possible to lead the same reasoning when inverting the
jurisdictions so that the rule in every jurisdiction is the Parity Rule. The same can be
said if fm = b and all the cases we face generate the eight Parity Rules. ¥
Theorem 4 says roughly the same as theorem 3. Its contribution, apart from yielding
a strange set of rules, is to show that the non-democratic feature of theorem 1 is due
to the stability condition rather than to the Local Pareto one, as relaxing it into Local
Faithfulness does not help achieving more acceptable rules.
Remark 3 As for theorem 3 we notice that, if C is not in the class of the Constant
Constitutions, all the rules characterized imply that all the jurisdiction rules are iden-
tical, fj = fj′.
5 Comments and Conclusion
5.1 Dictatorship
As a surprising feature, one can notice that dictatorship is not in the set of stable rules
for constitutions satisfying either Local Pareto or the weaker Local Faithfulness condi-
tion. This is all the most surprising as dictatorship is usually the rule one obtains in the
more classical impossibility results, such as Arrow’s and Gibbard and Satterthwaite’s
theorems.
The reason is the following: in a federal constitution, the description of the voting
procedure has to include a definition of the jurisdictional rules as well as the federal
voting rule. Hence, if individual i is a dictator, it can be detected in the jurisdiction in
which i votes. However, at the federal level, there is no information remaining about
the identity of the voters, as the rule is based on the results in all jurisdictions.
The most natural way to define dictatorship would be to state that the jurisdiction
in which i votes will elect according to i’s choice, while all the other jurisdictions elect
the same candidate as the one elected in i’s jurisdiction. However, this implies that
the result of the other jurisdictions changes whenever individual i changes his choice, a
violation of Jurisdiction Sovereignty.
There is, however, a second way to define dictatorship in a federal constitution
satisfying Jurisdiction Sovereignty, which is rather complicated. It is the following: all
jurisdictions elect the same candidate aj, thus independently from individuals’ choices,
except that one containing individual i, which elects the candidate chosen by individual
i. At the federal level, if all jurisdictions have elected candidate aj, then aj is the
winner. If one jurisdiction has voted for candidate ak, ak 6= aj, then the winner is ak.
This definition gives to individual i the power of a dictator.
However, this definition violates Local Faithfulness (and thus Local Pareto). It then
appears that dictatorship is excluded from our framework, either by the imposition of
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Jurisdiction Sovereignty, or by that of Local Faithfulness.
5.2 A comprehensive comparison of recent results
For a long time, the works of Murakami (1966) Fishburn (1971) and Fine (1972) were
the only contributions on the axiomatic analysis of two step voting rules. Clearly, the
2000 US presidential elections, as well as the debates about the European constitutions
that sprung out after the Nice treaty have revived the analysis of two step voting rules
in social choice theory. In this section we put our results into perspective by mentioning
recent contributions on the same issue.
Laffond and Laine´ (1999, 2000) started to analyze this issue in a series of published
or unpublished papers since 1999, by focusing on its relationship with the Ostrogorski’s
Paradox (see Nurmi (1999)) and the use of tournament solutions. Their model assumes
that voters have strict preference over a set X of alternatives, of cardinality greater than
3. The number of voters in the society is odd, as well as the number of jurisdictions.
Moreover, each jurisdiction has the same odd number of voters. Tournament solutions
can then be used in a two step procedure: the preferences of the voters in a jurisdiction
can be aggregated into a tournament via the majority rule, and the m tournaments
obtained in this way are aggregated into a federal tournament, which solution will
select a federal winner. The question is then to know whether a tournament solution
exists such that its implementation to the preference profile of n voters coincides with
the two step procedure described above. Laine´ and Laffond clearly show that direct and
representative democracy may lead to mutually inconsistent decisions when the society
uses the majority rule and tournament solutions. The strength of their results comes
from their ability to get an impossibility result with equal size constituencies, while we
need single voter jurisdictions to build our proofs.
Chambers (2003) reaches some impossibility results similar to ours although the
framework considered therein is quite different6. Two main assumptions, departing
from our study, are made in that contribution. First, the jurisdictional voting rules are
all identical, i.e. fj = f ∀j, and the federal voting rule is also the same, i.e. g = f . This
assumption therefore restricts the set of rules one can look for. As another consequence
of this assumption, it becomes impossible to impose different conditions on the rules fj
and g. For instance, whereas Local Pareto only applies to the jurisdictional rules in our
case, the same Pareto condition (which Chambers names Unanimity) applies on both
levels. Similarly, Anonymity is imposed on f from the start. Second, Chambers assumes
that the rule f should be defined for any finite number of voters. Thus the voting rule
used is defined for a variable population size, hence for any number of jurisdictions.
The results might not hold in the case of a fixed number n of individuals or for a
6We first heard about Chambers’ work in March 2005, although they existed since 2003, while
we reached our main results in April 2004. This explains why, although the results are similar, both
approach model similar issues in completely different manners.
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fixed number m of jurisdictions. In this framework, the non manipulability condition
imposed is “Representative Consistency”, stating that the indirect voting procedure
should yield the same result as the direct voting rule, i.e. f(f(pi), . . . , f(pi)) = f(pi).
As the number of jurisdictions is not fixed, the outcome should not change whether
the population is split in 2, 10 or any finite number of jurisdictions. Chambers reaches
characterization results for any finite number of alternatives, with a general theorem
stating that Anonymity, Representative Consistency and Unanimity together define
the class of Priority Rules, which coincides with the union of our Unanimity Rules and
Constant Constitutions in the case A = {a, b}.
The work by Perote-Pen˜a uses a similar framework: the fj’s are identical to g,
the number of jurisdiction may vary (though the total number of voters is fixed), the
anonymity condition is needed together with a gerrymander-proof assumption (here
called independence of institution formation, IIF) and the Pareto-Unanimity condi-
tion. The main contribution is that Perote-Pen˜a assumes that the voters can express
their whole preferences (represented by a weak ordering or a linear ordering) during
the voting process. He proves that IFF, Pareto and Neutrality are incompatible with
Anonymity. However, when droping Anonymity, he shows the existence of some rules,
the characterization of which still awaits.
5.3 Concluding remarks
This paper was devoted to the study of manipulation by the movement of voters in
federal constitutions. It appears that the only voting procedure that is non manipu-
lable when imposing a local paretian condition and when requiring in addition that
individuals should not have the power of overruling unanimous profiles, is the class of
Constant Constitutions. This class of rules is such that the winner of the election is
totally independent from the votes of the electors. This result is thus to be taken as an
impossibility one.
When restricting the analysis to the case of two candidates, and when assuming that
the result of the election should depend on the individuals’ votes, the set of Unanimity
Rules is characterized by the stability property when the local paretian condition is im-
posed. When relaxing this mild condition into a milder condition of Local Faithfulness,
according to which any jurisdiction formed of a singleton should elect the candidate
chosen by the lonely voter, another class of rules appears, that of Parity Rules. These
rules designate the winner of the election according to the parity of the number of votes
this candidate or his opponent receives.
All these negative results, together with ours, show that the existence of gerryman-
dering by the election designers or of manipulating by the electors, in two step electoral
systems, is a robust fact. Whatever the framework, all conclusions go in the same direc-
tion. As a consequence, it seems that the noble principle defended by the two European
deputies, according to which every European citizen should have the right to vote in
any country he is at the time of the European election, would generate undesirable
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manipulations. Unless the voting procedure is direct.
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